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NOTES AND COMMENTS
The Conscientious Objector Applying for
Political Asylum: Forced to Bear Arms
and the Brunt of M.A. A26851062 v. INS
I. INTRODUCTION
Few questions challenge the fundamental principles of the
United States more than whether an alien may base a claim for polit-
ical asylum' on conscientious objection. 2 The United States has long
recognized the right to conscientious objection. 3 Yet, when conscien-
tious objection arises in the context of a foreign national seeking polit-
ical asylum, United States policymakers and legislators must consider
the maintenance of its relations with other governments. 4 Indeed, the
1. The United States may consider an alien for asylum if the alien has a well-founded
fear of persecution in his or her home country. To be eligible for asylum, the applicant must
qualify as a refugee, as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42) (1988). See infra part III.A.
2. Exemption of conscientious objectors from military service is a privilege granted by
act of Congress. Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1988). Under the Selective
Service Act, conscientious objection must extend to participation in all wars, based on "reli-
gious training and belief." Id. In this Note, the definition of "conscientious objection" is
broader, and is based on the UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER ON REFUGEES, HAND-
BOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS (1979) [herein-
after HANDBOOK]. According to the Handbook, an objection may be based on political
convictions, as well as "religious training and belief." An objection need not extend to all
wars; it may be based upon particular wars or military actions. In the context of this Note, the
term "conscientious objectors" shall specifically refer to those who would rather flee their
home country than face compulsory service in a military unit that participates in activities that
violate the objector's religious, moral, or political convictions.
3. Conscientious objection hearkens from the early colonial period in the United States
and was well established by the time of the Revolutionary War. For an historical discussion of
conscientious objection in the United States from 1757 to 1967, see CONSCIENCE IN AMERICA
(Lilliam Schlissel ed., 1968). The earliest conscription law of the 1900s limited the exemption
to members of "peace churches," whose religions required abstention from all military service.
See Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 154, 40 Stat. 78 (repealed 1919). The current statute, as inter-
preted by the United States Supreme Court, is much broader than earlier conscription laws. It
provides exemption for those individuals who object to participation in all wars, based on
"religious training and belief." See 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.
333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965) ("religion" encompasses moral
and ethical beliefs in pacifism that are held with the strength of traditional religious
convictions).
4. See generally THOMAS A. ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PRO-
CESS AND POLICY 701-08 (1985).
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implications of conscientious objection cannot fully be discernable un-
til they are considered in the context of an alien's assertion of personal
convictions as the basis for a political asylum application. Denials of
asylum applications may ultimately mean the difference between life
and death.
The manner in which the United States decides the question of
asylum for an alien conscientious objector is critical to the interna-
tional resolution of the issue since many foreign nations consider the
United States a leader in asylum issues.5 Accordingly, United States
decisions command broad influence on the refugee policies of other
nations.
6
It may be argued, however, that other nations should not look to
the United States as the policy-making power with respect to political
asylum issues. It may further be contended that the United States has
failed to faithfully demonstrate its commitment to the fundamental
right of individual conscience when it reviews applications for asylum.
In March 1990, the Fourth Circuit decided M.A. A26851062 v.
INS 7 ("M.A. IF'), a case that presented two primary issues: (1) the
proper legal standard to apply to draft resisters who seek refugee sta-
tus; and (2) the degree of deference that the federal courts owe to the
Board of Immigration Appeals ("Board") when deciding motions to
reopen deportation proceedings. 8 The first issue raises the additional
questions of when a nation's enforcement of its conscription laws be-
comes unjustified, and when a draft evader may lawfully refuse to
serve because the military commits acts condemned by the interna-
5. The United States Committee for Refugees recognized the critical role the United
States plays in the refugee arena:
In a 1982 draft internal report on asylum adjudications, the [Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service] recognized the pivotal role of the United States: "As with other
issues, the United States is called upon to play a leadership role, for not only will our
policies and decisions impact on the people of our own nation but they will serve as
the international standard by which many other Western nations will evaluate their
own actions." It is not only Western nations who will note the conduct of the United
States toward asylum seekers. In Southeast Asia, in Africa, in Pakistan, where mil-
lions have found refuge, [United States] standards will not be ignored.
U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, DESPITE A GENEROUS SPIRIT: DENYING ASYLUM IN THE
UNITED STATES (1986).
6. Id.
7. 899 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc) [hereinafter M.A. I/]. In M.A. II, petitioner's
attorney, William Van Wyke, filed a formal motion to have petitioner's real name abbreviated
to the initials "M.A." This was done so that "terrorists" in El Salvador would not be able to
trace the allegations charged by M.A., in the event that he was sent back to El Salvador.
Telephone Interview with William Van Wyke, Member of the District of Columbia Bar (Feb.
12, 1991) [hereinafter Telephone Interview].
8. M.A. II, 899 F.2d at 305.
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tional community. Faced with these issues, the Fourth Circuit was
poised to become the first and only federal court to determine the
direct applicability of the United Nations' Handbook on Procedures
and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status9 ("Handbook') to an
alien claiming political asylum based on his refusal to perform mili-
tary service.
Based on its interpretation of the Handbook's applicable
paragraphs, the Fourth Circuit, in an en banc 6-5 decision,10 con-
cluded that M.A. was not a refugee for asylum purposes."1 The court
held that the Board properly denied M.A.'s motion to reopen his de-
portation proceedings for the purpose of requesting political asylum,
and thus affirmed the Board's decision ordering M.A.'s deportation. 12
This Note first discusses the factual background of M.A. II.
Next, it provides the historical backgrounds of political asylum, in
general, and of the Handbook. Additionally, this Note reviews and
criticizes the Fourth Circuit's analysis in M.A. II. Specifically, this
Note demonstrates how the Fourth Circuit incorrectly decided M.A.
H and created an improper legal standard to apply to alien draft re-
sisters who seek refugee status. This Note argues that the Fourth Cir-
cuit gave undue deference to the Board in cases involving motions to
reopen deportation proceedings. Although the Fourth Circuit cor-
rectly recognized the Handbook as controlling authority, the Fourth
Circuit misinterpreted and incorrectly applied Handbook paragraphs
167 through 174. The Fourth Circuit's decision is erroneous to the
extent that the Handbook paragraphs it examined clearly recommend
9. HANDBOOK, supra note 2. For an excellent discussion of the Handbook, see Karen
Musalo, Swords into Ploughshares: Why the United States Should Provide Refuge to Young
Men Who Refuse to Bear Arms for Reasons of Conscience, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 849, 852-58
(1989).
10. Interestingly, the 6-5 en banc opinion was split down political party lines. THE
AMERICAN BENCH: JUDGES OF THE NATION (Marie T. Hough et al. eds., 5th ed. 1989). The
six-person majority was exclusively comprised of Republican appointees, while the five-person
minority consisted of Democratic appointees. Id. The majority included Judge Chapman,
Judge Wilkins, Judge Wilkinson (all three appointed by President Reagan), Judge Russell,
Judge Widener (both appointed by President Nixon), and Judge Hall (appointed by President
Ford). Id. The minority included Judge Ervin, Judge Murnaghan, Judge Phillips, Judge
Sprouse (all four appointed by President Carter), and Judge Winter (appointed by President
Johnson). Id.
Judge Winter, Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, authored the
dissenting opinion. Judge Winter died of cancer on April 10, 1991, less than two weeks after
M.A. II was decided. Harrison Winter, 69, Federal Appeals Judge, N.Y. TIMES, April 11,
1990, at D26. M.A. H represents the last decision Judge Winter authored.
11. M.A. II, 899 F.2d at 316.
12. Id. at 312.
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refugee status for conscientious objectors similarly situated to M.A. t3
Furthermore, this Note asserts that the Fourth Circuit overempha-
sized the procedural posture of the case, thereby clouding the pure
legal issues before the court. Finally, this Note attacks the manner in
which the court hid behind the procedural wall it erected, so that it
could deny the effects its decision would have on evidentiary issues in
political asylum proceedings.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner M.A. fled his native El Salvador in 1982.14 He entered
the United States illegally in February 1982.15 On February 22, 1984,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") initiated depor-
tation hearings against M.A.16 At his deportation hearing, M.A. con-
ceded that he had entered the United States without inspection,
admitted deportability, and asked the INS to permit him to volunta-
rily leave the United States.17 On the advice of counsel, M.A. did not
request political asylum. Rather, he specifically identified El Salvador
as his "country of choice" for deportation, and stated that he had no
fear of returning there.18 The immigration judge granted M.A.'s re-
quest to leave the United States voluntarily, and set September 16,
1984, as the departure deadline.' 9 On January 15, 1985, however,
M.A. had still not departed from the United States. He was conse-
quently apprehended by the INS,2° and detained in the Baltimore,
Maryland city jail.21
On January 21, 1985, one day before his planned deportation,
M.A. claimed for the first time that he feared persecution in El Salva-
dor due to his political and moral views. 22 Through new counsel,
M.A. filed a motion with the INS to reopen his case, in order to re-
13. HANDBOOK, supra note 2, paras. 167-74.
14. M.A. A26851062 v. INS, 858 F.2d 210, 216 (4th Cir. 1988) [hereinafter M.A. 1],
superceded by M.A. II, 899 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
15. M.A. II, 899 F.2d at 305-06. M.A. entered the country "without inspection;" that is,
he did not enter at a visa checkpoint. In fact, M.A. crossed the Rio Grande River to enter the
United States. Telephone Interview, supra note 7.





21. MA. I, 858 F.2d at 212.
22. M.A. II, 899 F.2d at 306. M.A. asserted his fear of persecution after obtaining new
counsel. Id.
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quest political asylum. 23 The motion asserted that, due to the ineffec-
tive assistance of M.A.'s former counsel, M.A. failed to present the
asylum application before the close of deportation proceedings. 24 An
immigration judge denied M.A.'s request,25 and the Board affirmed
the judge's decision. 26 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed and
remanded on the ground that M.A. had a reasonable explanation for
not requesting asylum at the initial hearing. 2
7
On remand, M.A. presented a new petition for reopening, a re-
newed application for asylum, and additional evidence in support of
the renewed application. 28 The sole issue before the immigration
judge was whether M.A. presented a prima facie case for political asy-
lum, such that his deportation proceeding could be reopened to allow
proof of his eligibility. 29 M.A. asserted that he left El Salvador "to
avoid serving in its violent military. ' 30 He alleged that, as part of the
government's deliberate policy, the Salvadoran military committed
"'systematic and widespread' human rights violations against the citi-
zens of El Salvador."' a To corroborate these general charges, M.A.
presented evidence from Amnesty International and Americas
Watch. 32 To prove that his fears were personal, M.A. claimed to have
witnessed the results of this violence. 33 Specifically, he claimed that
23. Id.
24. Id. M.A.'s new counsel also sought a ten-day continuance to prepare a prima facie
claim of eligibility for asylum consideration. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. M.A. , 858 F.2d at 212. The court further found that the immigration judge abused
his discretion in denying M.A. ten days to augment his asylum claim. Id. Judicial review of a
final deportation hearing order normally obtains by petition for review in a United States court
of appeals. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1988).
28. M.A. II, 899 F.2d at 306.
29. M.A. 1, 858 F.2d at 212-13.
30. MA. II, 899 F.2d at 306.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 312. Amnesty International was founded in 1961 in response to a growing
number of people who were imprisoned for political reasons. Ann Durrell, The Conscience of
Amnesty, CAN. LAW., 21-22 (Oct. 1980). The mandate of Amnesty International is to non-
violently oppose torture, capital punishment, and the detention of individuals for their political
or religious beliefs, or ethnic or racial origins. Amnesty International calls these individuals
"prisoners of conscience." Id. at 22. Both Amnesty International and Americas Watch have
condemned the Salvadoran military and security forces for committing violent acts against all
sectors of Salvadoran society. MA. II, 899 F.2d at 312. They report that the Salvadoran
military engages in "extrajudicial execution on noncombatant civilians, individual death
squad-style killings, 'disappearances,' arbitrary detention and torture." Id. Moreover, they
contend that the military violence is carried out pursuant to a deliberate policy of the Salvado-
ran government, designed to further that government's political interests. Id.
33. MA. II, 899 F.2d at 306.
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he had passed through a morgue and had seen "mutilated, decapi-
tated, bruised, and gunned bodies."'3 4 M.A. further stated that the
military had killed three of his relatives,3 5 that a member of the civil-
ian patrol had once threatened him, and that soldiers had twice
beaten him.3 6 Collectively, these general and personal claims evi-
denced his fear that if he returned to El Salvador and failed to serve in
the military, he would be tortured and possibly killed as an opposition
sympathizer.
Despite the introduction of this evidence, the immigration judge
denied the new motion to reopen, and held that M.A. failed to meet
his evidentiary burden of making out a prima facie case for asylum
eligibility. 37 The Board affirmed, supporting its conclusion with the
internationally recognized principle that it is not persecution for a
country to require military service of its citizens.38 The Board further
reasoned that M.A. did not come within one of the narrow exceptions
to this well-settled policy.3 9 The Board based its conclusion on its
determination that M.A. did not show that the violence represented
the policy of the Salvadoran government, or that the violence was
condemned by recognized governmental bodies.4° The Board also
held that M.A. failed to show that military service would force him to
be associated with the alleged atrocities, or that his refusal to serve
would result in disproportionately severe punishment.41 Finally, the
Board found that M.A.'s claims lacked factual support and were
"simply too speculative. ' ' 42
34. Id.
35. IaL M.A. claimed that one cousin was killed by the army for participation in an anti-
government demonstration; another cousin was killed by the guerilla army; and his brother-in-
law's brother was killed by a "death squad" for providing food to guerillas. Id.
36. Id M.A. alleged that National Guardsmen beat him twice at roadblocks, once for
being suspected of covert political activity, and once for no apparent reason. Id. at 325 (Win-
ter, J., dissenting). M.A. further alleged that a friend once recruited him to serve as a spy for
the army but, after attending several meetings with military representatives, he refused to par-
ticipate, despite his knowledge that others who were uncooperative had been killed by the
government. Id.
37. Id at 306. This prima facie evidentiary burden is a prerequisite to reopening, pursu-
ant to 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1988). Id
38. M.A. II, 899 F.2d at 306; see also Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 378
(1918).
39. M.A. II, 899 F.2d at 306. For a discussion of the narrow exceptions to the rule that a
sovereign has the absolute right to raise and maintain armies, see infra text accompanying
notes 71-79.
40. M.A. II, 899 F.2d at 306.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 306-07.
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A panel of the Fourth Circuit again reversed the Board's order.43
The panel determined that M.A. had, in fact, made out the prima
facie case of refugee eligibility to justify reopening.44 Thus, the panel
held that M.A. was entitled to consideration for political asylum,
based on his sincere objections to participating in the Salvadoran
armed forces. 45 On January 5, 1989, the Fourth Circuit granted the
Justice Department's request for a rehearing en banc,46 based on the
Department's position that M.A.'s case presented an issue of "excep-
tional importance" that could have "an enormous potential impact"
on United States asylum law. 47 The Fourth Circuit reversed the
court's panel decision by a 6-5 vote, thereby affirming the judgment of
the Board. 48 Accordingly, M.A. was ordered deported to El Salva-
dor.49 This Note addresses the Fourth Circuit's en banc decision.
III. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF POLITICAL ASYLUM
This section of the Note provides an historical background of
political asylum. It first addresses how the asylum process operates
pursuant to federal statutes and regulations, and further discusses
how different legal authorities define the term "refugee." Addition-
ally, this section compares how the Handbook, federal statutes, and
federal regulations address political asylum in the refugee context.
A. The Refugee Concept and Political Asylum Under the 1980
Refugee Act
Although a detailed description of how an alien applies for polit-
ical asylum is beyond the scope of this Note, a brief analysis of the
process is helpful to the discussion of M.A. II. The Refugee Act of
198050 ("Refugee Act"), as amended by the Immigration Act of
43. M.A. 1, 858 F.2d at 220. The panel's opinion to reverse was authored by Judge Win-
ter, who also authored the dissenting opinion in the case analyzed in this Note. M.A. I1, 899
F.2d at 316; see also supra note 10.
44. M.A. 1, 858 F.2d at 220.
45. Id.
46. M.A. A26851062 v. INS, 866 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1989).
47. John A. Detzner, Aliens-Political Asylum-Eligibility of Salvadoran Draft Evader
for Refugee Status-Refusal to Associate with Military Force That Engages in Internationally
Condemned Acts of Violence, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 384, 385 (1989).
48. M.A. 11, 899 F.2d at 307.
49. Id.
50. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (amending Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)), amended by Immigration
1991]
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1990,51 determines whether an alien is eligible for political asylum.
The Refugee Act represented significant departures from the ref-
ugee and asylum policies effective in the United States before 1980.52
It established, for the first time, a statutory basis for granting asylum
to refugees already present in the United States.-3 Additionally, the
Refugee Act brought United States refugee law into compliance with
the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees54
("Protocol") and with the United Nations Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees 55 ("Convention").
In pertinent part, the Refugee Act provides:
The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien
physically present in the United States or at a land border or port
of entry, irrespective of such alien's status, to apply for asylum,
and the alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attor-
ney General if the Attorney General determines that such alien is a
refugee within the meaning of section I10 1(a)(42)(A) of this title.
56
Thus, whether or not an applicant is eligible for political asylum
under the Refugee Act turns on whether the alien is a "refugee"
within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § I101(a)(42)(A). The Refugee Act
adopted the Protocol's definition of "refugee" to include
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality
Act of 1990, Pub L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (to be codified in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
The Refugee Act provides two forms of relief: political asylum, pursuant to section
1101(a)(42); and withholding of deportation, pursuant to section 1253(h). Political asylum
relief is within the discretionary authority of the Attorney General and is available to individu-
als who meet the refugee definition. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988). Withholding of deporta-
tion is a mandatory form of relief available to individuals who establish that their "life or
freedom would be threatened .. . on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group or political opinion" upon return to their home country. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1253(h) (1988).
51. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (to be codified
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). The Immigration Act of 1990 represents what is probably
the most sweeping reform in United States immigration law in the last 40 years. By signing the
Immigration Act of 1990 into law on November 29, 1990, President George Bush touched on
virtually every aspect of immigration law. The changes to the Refugee Act will be highlighted
in this Note, to the extent they are relevant to the political asylum and conscientious objector
discussions.
52. See generally Debra E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis.- A Legisla-
tive History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 11 (1981).
53. Id.
54. Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Protocol].
55. July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137. The Convention is incorporated, by
reference, into the Protocol. Id.
56. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a).
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or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any
country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of,
that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of perse-
cution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.
57
In sum, the Refugee Act confers on the Attorney General and
his delegates 58 discretionary powers to grant asylum to an alien pres-
ent in the United States, if that alien satisfies the statutory definition
of refugee. Hence, political asylum involves a two-step process. Ini-
tially, the immigration authorities must decide whether the applicant
meets the statutory requirements of asylum eligibility. Then, the At-
torney General and his delegates may exercise their discretion to
either withhold or deport the alien.
Since Congress enacted the Refugee Act, courts have struggled
to define the scope of the term "refugee." As would be expected, the
INS has emphatically argued for a narrow scope that limits the cate-
gories of individuals entitled to Refugee Act protection, or for an in-
terpretation that increases the asylum applicant's burden of proof.59
Also as expected, the Board generally affirms the immigration judges'
decisions. However, federal courts frequently reverse the Board.
60
Thus, the scope of the Refugee Act is unsettled.
The Fourth Circuit encountered a special problem in analyzing
M.A.'s claim of political asylum, based on the Refugee Act's defini-
57. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
58. The Attorney General has delegated his authority and discretion to reopen deporta-
tion proceedings to the INS Commissioner and to immigration judges, whose decisions are
then reviewable by the Board. 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1988); 8 C.F.R. §§ 2.1, 242.8(a), 242.21
(1991).
59. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449-50 (1987) (rejecting the INS'
holding that political asylum applicants must establish a clear probability of persecution,
rather than the more generous well-founded fear standard); see also Anthony Asuncion, Note,
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca: Establishment of a More Liberal Asylum Standard, 37 AM. U. L.
REV. 915, 918 (1988) (discussing the fact that courts and the INS have often differed over the
appropriate standard of proof necessary to qualify for asylum).
60. One need only look at the procedural posture of the case at issue to see disparate
opinions between the Board and the courts. For other examples of inconsistent opinions, see
Blanco-Lopez v. INS, 858 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1988) (reversing the Board's holding that beat-
ings and death threats against a Salvadoran accused of gun-running did not constitute persecu-
tion); Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984) (reversing the Board's holding
that an alien who suffered a direct and credible threat against his life on account of his desire
to remain neutral was not eligible for relief); Barraza-Rivera v. INS, 913 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir.
1990) (reversing the Board's decision that an alien, who based his persecution claim on his
objection to participation in unconscionable acts, was not eligible for asylum).
1991]
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tion of "refugee." This problem stemmed from the fact that M.A.'s
fear of persecution claim was based largely upon his status as a draft
evader. 6' The definition of "refugee" adopted by the Refugee Act
does not explicitly include aliens who base their applications for polit-
ical asylum on a refusal to serve in a home country's military. Thus,
if a court is to conclude that the definition of "refugee" includes a
conscientious objector, the conclusion must be based on authority
outside of the Refugee Act's text.
B. The Refugee Concept Under the Handbook
The idea that an individual who evades compulsory military ser-
vice for reasons of conscience may be a "refugee," and thereby eligible
for political asylum, has its genesis in the Handbook.62 The Hand-
book identifies deserters and individuals avoiding military service as a
special category of refugees.63 Specifically, the Handbook recom-
mends refugee status for individuals who flee their home countries to
avoid serving in the military against their "genuine political, religious
or moral convictions, or ... valid reasons of conscience." 64
The United Nations General Assembly established the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 65 ("UNHCR")
and charged it with the "duty of supervising the application of the
provisions" of the Protocol. 66 The UNHCR prepared the Handbook
to help guide member states in applying the Protocol. 67 Since its
preparation, the Handbook has been widely circulated and approved
by governments, including the United States.68
61. M.A. II, 899 F.2d 304, 306 (4th Cir. 1990).
62. HANDBOOK, supra note 2, para. 170.
63. Id. paras. 167-74.
64. Id. para. 170.
65. G.A. Res. 319A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 36, U.N. Doc. A/1251 (1949), revised by
U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1951).
66. Id.; see also Protocol, supra note 54, art. II, 1.
The States Parties to the present Protocol undertake to co-operate with the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or any other agency of the
United Nations which may succeed it, in the exercise of its functions, and shall in
particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the provisions of the
present Protocol.
Id.
67. Report of the 28th Session for the Executive Comm. of the High Commissioner's Pro-
gramme, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/549, 53.6(g) (1977).
68. Report of the 30th Session for the Executive Comm. of the High Commissioner's Pro-
gramme, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/572, at 68, 72(a)(h) (1979); Report of the 31st Session for the
Executive Comm. of the High Commissioner's Programme, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/588, at 36
(1980). Although the United Nations had not yet published the Handbook when Congress
passed the Refugee Act, the Department of Justice stated that Congress must have intended
[Vol. 14:139
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While United States courts and administrative agencies are not
bound by the Handbook, they regard it as an internationally respected
instrument for resolving refugee issues.69 In fact, the Fourth Circuit,
in M.A. II, noted that the Handbook provided "significant guidance"
in the court's review of the issues before it.7o
The Handbook's recommendation of refugee status for conscien-
tious objectors is an exception to the well-settled rule that a sovereign
nation enjoys the right to enforce its draft laws, and that penalties for
evasion are not considered persecution.71 Despite this tradition, the
Handbook provides, in paragraphs 167 through 174, that refugee sta-
tus should be granted where (1) refusal to serve in the military results
not in normal draft evasion penalties, but in disproportionately severe
punishment based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a par-
ticular social group, or political opinion; 72 or (2) the alien's desertion
or failure to serve is based on "genuine political, religious or moral
convictions, or... valid reasons of conscience. '7
3
With regard to the first exception, the Handbook states that,
although governments may punish an individual for the criminal of-
fense of draft evasion or desertion, the government may not discrimi-
the Handbook to serve as an interpretive guide to the Refugee Act. "[W]e assume that Con-
gress was aware of the criteria articulated in the Handbook when it passed the Act in 1980, and
that it is appropriate to consider the guidelines in the Handbook as an aid to the construction
of the Act." MA. 1, 858 F.2d 210, 214-15 n.3 (4th Cir. 1988) (quoting U.S. Refugee Program:
Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 24, 26 (1981) (memorandum from
Theodore B. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to David Crossland,
General Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization Service)), superceded by MA. II, 899 F.2d
304 (4th Cir. 1990).
69. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 439 n.22 (stating that "the Handbook provides sig-
nificant guidance").
70. M.A. II, 899 F.2d at 312 n.5 (quoting Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 439 n.22).
71. HANDBOOK, supra note 2, paras. 167-74; see, e.g., Espinoza-Martinez v. INS, 754
F.2d 1536, 1540 (9th Cir. 1985); Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 1988) (refer-
ring to the "legitimate authority to raise armies" possessed by national sovereigns); see also
United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902, 908 (D. Mass. 1969) (discussing the fact that the
obligation to militarily defend the state is a fundamental obligation of citizenship); Musalo,
supra note 9, at 853-54.
72. HANDBOOK, supra note 2, para. 169. Further,
[a] deserter or draft-evader may also be considered a refugee if it can be shown that
he would suffer disproportionately severe punishment for the military offence on ac-
count of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion. The same would apply if it can be shown that he has well-founded
fear of persecution on these grounds above and beyond the punishment for desertion.
Id.
73. Id..para. 170.
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natorily apply the punishment.74  The Handbook recognizes the
possibility that a government might severely punish an individual be-
cause of race, religion, nationality, social group membership, or polit-
ical opinion. Such action, according to the Handbook, transforms the
punishment into persecution.
75
The second exception addresses conscientious objectors and was
at issue in M.A. II. It acknowledges the fundamental democratic
principle that a state should respect the divergent beliefs and opinions
of its citizenry, and that punishing individuals for obeying the dictates
of their consciences constitutes persecution.76 Specifically, the Hand-
book provides:
[T]he necessity to perform military service may be the sole ground
for a claim to refugee status, i.e., when a person can show that the
performance of military service would have required his participa-
tion in military action contrary to his genuine political, religious or
moral convictions, or to valid reasons of conscience.
77
The Handbook further states:
Not every conviction, genuine though it may be, will constitute a
sufficient reason for claiming refugee status after desertion or draft
evasion .... Where, however, the type of military action, with
which an individual does not wish to be associated, is condemned
by the international community as contrary to basic rules of human
conduct, punishment for desertion or draft evasion could, in light of
all other requirements of the definition, in itself be regarded as
persecution .78
The plain language of the Handbook's recommendation makes a
distinction between the individual who refuses military service for le-
gitimate reasons of conscience and the individual who simply refuses
military service due to "dislike of military service or fear of com-
bat."' 79 Thus, a court considering the issue of conscientious objection
as a basis for political asylum must balance the state's right to raise
and maintain armies against the rights of the individual. When the
individual's refusal is not based on reasons of conscience, the state's
74. Id. para. 169; see also Musalo, supra note 9, at 856.
75. The Handbook and federal precedent recognize that the line between prosecution and
persecution is not clear. HANDBOOK, supra note 2, para. 57 ("The distinction [between prose-
cution and persecution] may, however, occasionally be obscured .... ); see Musalo, supra note
9, at 856.
76. HANDBOOK, supra note 2, paras. 170-73; see also Musalo, supra note 9, at 856.
77. HANDBOOK, supra note 2, para. 170 (emphasis added).
78. Id. para. 171 (emphasis added).
79. Id. para. 168; see also Musalo, supra note 9, at 856.
[Vol. 14:139
Asylum for the Conscientious Objector
interest in maintaining its military should generally prevail. How-
ever, the Handbook suggests that the balance shifts when the state's
right is weighed against society's interest in nurturing and encourag-
ing the moral conscience of the individual. In these cases, the Hand-
book suggests that democratic values dictate that the state should
refrain from requiring individuals to act in a manner that is contradic-
tory to their consciences, whenever possible.
Broad democratic policy notwithstanding, the Handbook does
require that aliens who apply for asylum eligibility based upon refisal
to perform military service meet specific criteria. First, applicants
must demonstrate that their convictions are genuine and that their
home country does not recognize these convictions.80 Second, alien
conscientious objectors must establish that the military action with
which they do not wish to be associated is "condemned by the inter-
national community as contrary to basic rules of human conduct."'
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
This section of the Note discusses the manner in which the
Fourth Circuit analyzed M.A.'s case, eventually deciding to affirm the
Board's decision ordering M.A.'s deportation. This section first de-
scribes the court's decision to review M.A.'s asylum claim, using an
abuse of discretion standard. It then discusses the court's conclusion
that M.A. failed to present a prima facie case against deportation,
based on this abuse of discretion standard.
A. Standard of Review for Reopening Hearings
The Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, began its analysis of M.A.'s
case by emphasizing the significance of the case's procedural pos-
ture-that M.A. requested asylum in the context of a motion to reo-
pen finalized deportation proceedings. 82 This posture was important
because the immigration statutes do not require or even explicitly
contemplate reopening procedures. 83 Instead, the Attorney General
80. HANDBOOK, supra note 2, para. 171. The constitution of El Salvador states that
military service is compulsory for all Salvadoran males between the ages of 18 and 30. M.A. I,
858 F.2d at 216 n.5. Although M.A. was over 30 when he was eventually deported, the Salva-
doran constitution further provides that, "in case of need," all Salvadorans suitable for per-
forming military tasks shall be soldiers. Another Salvadoran law requires all Salvadoran men
between the ages of 18 and 50 to serve in times of war. Id.
81. HANDBOOK, supra note 2, para. 171.
82. M.A. II, 899 F.2d 304, 307 (4th Cir. 1990).
83. Id.
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promulgated motions to reopen finalized deportation proceedings
through regulations enacted in his discretion under the immigration
statutes.
84
Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in INS v. Abudu,85 the
majority articulated three independent grounds upon which the
Board can deny a motion to reopen.8 6 First, the Board may deny a
motion because the movant failed to establish a prima facie case of
asylum eligibility. 87 Second, the Board may deny a motion because
the movant failed to comply with the regulatory requirements of 8
C.F.R. § 3.288 or § 208.11.89 Finally, the Board may deny a motion
to reopen solely on discretionary grounds, even if the movant satisfies
the first two grounds.90
At issue in M.A. II was whether M.A. established a prima facie
case of eligibility for asylum.91 The majority noted that, although the
Supreme Court in Abudu 92 explicitly declined to address the standard
of review for a denial of reopening based on this ground, it concluded
that an abuse of discretion standard was appropriate for the other two
grounds upon which the Board could have based its denial.
93
In the absence of Supreme Court guidance, the majority con-
cluded that it would review M.A.'s asylum claim using an abuse of
discretion standard.94 The Fourth Circuit relied on the same reason-
84. Id. (citing INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 446 (1985)).
85. 485 U.S. 94 (1988). In Abudu, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's order
granting an alien's motion to reopen.
86. M.A. II, 899 F.2d at 308 (quoting Abudu, 485 U.S. at 104-05).
87. Id.
88. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 provides that a denial is proper when the movant fails to introduce
previously unavailable material evidence. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1991).
89. 8 C.F.R. § 208.11, which was in effect at the time both Abudu and M.A. H were
decided, explicitly provided for the filing of asylum requests after completion of deportation
hearings. Under this regulation, a denial would have been proper if the movant did not rea-
sonably explain his failure to apply for asylum initially. 8 C.F.R. § 208.11 (1988); 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.11 (1990). Its 1991 counterpart is contained in 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(2). The new regulation
also explicitly provides for such dilatory asylum requests. However, the regulation does not
explicitly require a reasonable explanation for the failure to apply for asylum initially. 8
C.F.R. § 208.4(2) (1991).
In any case, in M.A. II, the court mooted any consideration of M.A.'s untimeliness when
it ruled that M.A. had, in fact, reasonably explained his failure to apply for asylum at his
original hearing. M.A. II, 899 F.2d at 306.
90. M.A. II, 899 F.2d at 308 (quoting Abudu, 485 U.S. at 104-05).
91. Id.
92. 485 U.S. at 104.
93. M.A. II, 899 F.2d at 308.
94. Id. The majority reached a conclusion contrary to the de novo standard petitioner
suggested. The court reasoned that:
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ing the Supreme Court used in Abudu to justify an abuse of discretion
standard for the other two grounds.95 First, the language of the regu-
lations treats reopening as an "extraordinary remedy."'96 The Board
may suspend final judgment and address the merits of an immigration
claim only in the "most clearly meritorious cases," leaving factual de-
terminations to the Board. 97 Further, the extraordinary nature of the
remedy was implicit in the regulation's 98 negative language that "mo-
tions to reopen 'shall not be granted' unless certain showings are
made." 99
Based upon its findings that the immigration statutes do not con-
template reopening, and that the Attorney General's regulations gen-
erally disfavor reopening, the court concluded that it must review
denials under the reopening regulations with "extreme deference."0
The regulations did not explicitly provide as a basis for denial the
failure to establish prima facie eligibility for political asylum.101
Rather, the Board interpreted its own regulations to create this
"prima facie" basis for denial. 10 2 Because the Board created this
ground for denial, its decision to deny a motion on this ground "is
entitled to extraordinary respect. °10 3 Moreover, since M.A.'s case in-
volved completed administrative proceedings, the concern of threat-
ening finality made an abuse of discretion standard even more
appropriate. 104
[t]he term "prima facie case" is not a buzzword that requires us to ignore the proce-
dural posture of the case... and go back to square one....
The Board has made clear that the "prima facie" test in the reopening context is
different from the prima facie test in an original proceeding, is limited to the regula-
tions themselves, and is more difficult to satisfy than statutory eligibility.
Id. at 309-10.
95. Id. at 308. Using an abuse of discretion standard, the court stated that it must affirm
the Board's denial of the motion to reopen, unless it "(1) was made without a rational explana-
tion, (2) inexplicably departed from established policies, or (3) rested on an impermissible basis
such as invidious discrimination against a particular race or group." Id. at 310 (quoting
Oviawe v. INS, 853 F.2d 1428, 1431 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing Achacoso-Sanchez v. INS, 779
F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985))).
96. Id. at 308.
97. Id. (citing INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 145 (1981)).
98. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2.
99. M.A. II, 899 F.2d at 308 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 3.2).
100. Id. at 308-09 (citing Sang Seup Shin v. INS, 750 F.2d 122, 131 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Starr, J., dissenting) ("The Board's discretion ... is at its zenith in making a discretionary
procedural determination [under the reopening regulations] which Congress did not see fit to
enact")).
101. Id. at 309.
102. Id.
103. Id. (citing Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566 (1980)).
104. M.A. II, 899 F.2d at 309.
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Finally, the court explained that it had to be sensitive to the "in-
herently political nature" of the deportation decision.10 5 Since Con-
gress charged the INS with implementing deportation policies, such
policies were best left to that agency. 16
B. M.A's Failure to Present a Prima Facie Case of Well-Founded
Fear
The Fourth Circuit next found that the Board did not abuse its
discretion in denying M.A.'s motion to reopen his deportation pro-
ceedings, as M.A. had failed to establish a prima facie case of a "well-
founded fear of persecution."10 7 The court referred to the settled rule
that courts must review aliens' claims of persecution in asylum pro-
ceedings with the "well-founded fear" standard of proof.108 In apply-
ing the "well-founded fear" standard, courts must examine not only
the subjective feelings of asylum applicants, but also the objective rea-
sons for the fears. 109 The Fourth Circuit held that the Board applied
this standard faithfully to the language of the Refugee Act, and con-
sistently with the pronouncements of the Supreme Court. 110
Specifically, the Board used a "reasonable person" approach to
define the nature of objective evidence that must be adduced for a
trier-of-fact to find, as well-founded, an alien's subjective fear of perse-
cution. 1  According to the court, the Board properly acknowledged
that "[i]nternational law and Board precedent clearly establish that a
sovereign nation enjoys the right to enforce its laws of conscription,
105. Id
106. Id
107. Id at 311-12.
108. Id. (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1978)). In Cardoza-Fon-
seca, the Supreme Court rejected the Board's contention that applicants for political asylum
must show a clear probability of persecution, which is the standard for withholding of deporta-
tion, rather than the more generous well-founded fear standard. In his concurrence to this
decision, Justice Blackmun admonished the INS for its "seemingly purposeful blindness" in
developing the standards for relief under the Refugee Act. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 452.
109. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 430-31.
110. M.A. II, 899 F.2d at 311. In fact, the Fourth Circuit had already adopted an ap-
proach very similar to Cardoza-Fonseca, in Cruz-Lopez v. INS, 802 F.2d 1518 (4th Cir. 1986),
where the court held:
[T]he "well-founded fear" test requires the alien to establish that he has a subjective
fear of returning and that this fear has enough of a basis in specific facts to be consid-
ered "well-founded" upon objective evaluation. The alien must offer "specific facts"
detailing a "good reason" to fear persecution, or establishing an objectively reason-
able "expectation of persecution."
Cruz-Lopez, 802 F.2d at 1522 (citations omitted).
111. M.A. II, 899 F.2d at 311.
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and that penalties for evasion are not considered persecution."' 1 2
Thus, M.A. could not claim a well-founded fear of persecution based
solely on his desire not to join El Salvador's military.
As a conscientious objector, M.A. would have to come within
one of the Handbook's exceptions to be eligible for asylum.11 3 In par-
ticular, M.A. would have to show that (1) he would be associated
with a military whose acts were condemned by the international com-
munity as contrary to the basic rules of human conduct; or (2) his
refusal to serve in the military would result in disproportionately se-
vere draft evasion penalties, based on one of the five grounds enumer-
ated in the Refugee Act, including race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
1 14
M.A. attempted to establish his entitlement to relief under the
first exception, alleging that the Salvadoran military committed acts
contrary to the basic rules of human conduct.' 5 The court, however,
rejected this contention, and held that M.A. failed to present "cogni-
zable evidence that the alleged atrocities he wanted to avoid were per-
petrated as a result of the policies of the Salvadoran military or
government."" 6 Thus, at least initially, the court required M.A. to
satisfy a two-prong test to qualify for relief under the first exception:
(1) M.A. was required to show cognizable proof of internationally
condemned conduct performed by the state's military; and (2) M.A.
was required to prove that this violence was "connected with official
governmental policy.' ' 7 The court feared that a less stringent test
would enable any alien eligible for the draft in a strife-torn country to
establish a well-founded fear of persecution."18
Significantly, the court rejected the primary evidence that M.A.
submitted to satisfy the court's two-prong test-reports from "promi-
nent" private organizations, such as Amnesty International and
Americas Watch." 9 These organizations reported, among other
things, 20 that military violence in El Salvador was carried out pursu-
ant to a deliberate policy of the Salvadoran government to further its
112. Id. at 312 (citations omitted).
113. Id.
114. Id.; see HANDBOOK, supra note 2, paras. 169, 171; 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).





120. See supra note 32.
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political interests.12, The court held that the Board properly refused
to recognize these private reports. 12 2 This conclusion was based on
the court's belief that the Handbook required condemnation from
"recognized international governmental bodies," rather than from pri-
vate organizations. 23 In fact, the court feared that any other stan-
dard would breed a host of other problems:
A standard of asylum eligibility based solely on pronouncements of
private organizations or the news media is problematic almost to
the point of being non-justiciable.... We do not know how courts
are expected to evaluate the proffered explanations for various inci-
dents of military activity or to gauge the extent to which such ac-
tivity may or may not implicate official policies. We are also
uncertain of the criteria by which courts would analyze the reports
of private groups.124
In effect, the court added a third prong to its prima facie test. It
required that the violence not only be internationally condemned and
part of the government's deliberate policy, but also that such condem-
nation come from "international governmental bodies."'' 25 The ma-
jority reasoned that courts cannot declare that another country,
which the international community has not condemned, engages in
persecution of its citizens. 126 That role would "transform the political
asylum process from a method of individual sanctuary left largely to
the political branches into a vehicle for foreign policy debates in the
courts."1 27 The United States Constitution does not authorize such a
role. 128
121. M.A. II, 899 F.2d at 312. The counterargument, of course, is that the military must
resort to violent means to quell the unlawful actions of groups on the fringe who refuse to
participate in nonviolent means of change.
122. Id
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 313.
125. Id. at 312-13 (emphasis added).
126. M.A. II, 899 F.2d at 313 ("[T]o accept the claim of someone to qualify for refugee
status is publicly to accuse some other state of engaging in persecution.") (quoting Frederick
G. Whelan, Principles of U.S. Immigration Policy, 44 U. Pr. L. REV. 447, 479-80 (1983)).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 313-14. A thorough discussion of the political question doctrine is beyond the
scope of this Note. In general, a case can involve a political question where a court finds there
is: (1) "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate polit-
ical department;" (2) "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it;" (3) "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for nonjudicial discretion;" (4) "the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolu-
tion without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government;" (5) "an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;" or (6) "the
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Moreover, the majority questioned the veracity of the substantive
information provided by Amnesty International and Americas
Watch, stating that, "[a]lthough we do not wish to disparage the work
of private investigative bodies in exposing inhumane practices, these
organizations may have their own agendas and concerns, and their
condemnations are virtually omnipresent."'
129
Finally, the Fourth Circuit rejected M.A.'s attempt to fall within
the Refugee Act's second exception for persecution based on race,
religion, nationality, social group membership, or political opinion. 1
30
The court reasoned that M.A. failed to show any specific threat to
himself based on any one of these factors. 131 Rather, the court con-
cluded, M.A.'s claims amounted to nothing more than a fear of the
general violence incidental to civil war in El Salvador.132 The court
found that this fear was endemic to the entire population. 133 Accord-
ingly, M.A. was outside of the scope of the Refugee Act's exceptions
and was ineligible for asylum. 134
V. CRITIQUE OF THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S EN BANC DECISION
This section of the Note addresses three sources of error in the
Fourth Circuit's opinion. First, this section asserts that the majority
improperly established an abuse of discretion standard for reviewing
prima facie eligibility for political asylum proceedings. Second, it as-
serts that the Fourth Circuit, using this improper standard of review,
failed to properly adhere to the language and mandate of the Hand-
book. Instead, the court required that M.A. meet additional, unwar-
ranted criteria. Finally, this section contends that, even as M.A.
sought to satisfy the court's overly stringent test, the Fourth Circuit
improperly ignored relevant and convincing evidence from Amnesty
International and Americas Watch.
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). The Fourth Circuit apparently was
concerned with the fourth issue-the lack of respect due the executive and legislative branches.
129. M.A. II, 899 F.2d at 313.
130. 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A).
131. MA. II, 899 F.2d at 315.
132. Id. at 314.
133. Id at 315.
134. Id.
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A. A De Novo Review Is the Appropriate Standard of Review
Where Denial Is Based on the Failure to Establish Prima
Facie Eligibility for Political Asylum
In INS v. Abudu,135 the United States Supreme Court recognized
at least three grounds upon which a Board may deny an alien's mo-
tion to reopen deportation proceedings.136 The Abudu decision would
have required an abuse of discretion standard in M.A. II had the
Board denied M.A.'s motion to reopen because (1) M.A. failed to in-
troduce previously unavailable, material evidence, or reasonably ex-
plain his failure to apply for asylum initially; or (2) M.A. was not
entitled to a discretionary grant of relief.1 37 These factors comprise
the Board's discretionary authority and, if applied, properly trigger
the abuse of discretion standard. However, these were not the factors
upon which the Board refused to reopen M.A.'s proceedings.1
38
Rather, the Board considered whether M.A. adduced sufficient evi-
dence to establish a prima facie case of refugee eligibility-that is,
whether M.A. had a well-founded fear of persecution.
1 39
In holding that M.A. failed to establish a prima facie case, the
Board limited itself to an analysis of the immigration statutes,14° the
Handbook,'41 and the United States Supreme Court's decision in INS
v. Cardoza-Fonseca.142 Based on these authorities, the Board con-
cluded that, in order to qualify for refugee status, M.A. must show (1)
a formal government policy calling for the commitment of atrocities
by its military; (2) condemnation of the military action in question by
international governmental bodies; and (3) that, as a member of the
armed forces, M.A. would personally engage in these atrocities.
143
In sum, the Board did not deny M.A.'s motion to reopen under
its discretionary authority. Instead, as a matter of law, it formulated
new legal rules based on its interpretation of a federal statute, a
Supreme Court decision, and an authoritative international docu-
ment. Having done so, as the dissenting opinion in M.A. II as-
135. 485 U.S. 94 (1988).
136. Id at 104-05; see supra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
137. Abudu, 485 U.S. at 104-05.
138. M.A. II, 899 F.2d at 306-07. In fact, M.A. reasonably explained his failure to apply
for asylum as due to ineffective assistance of former counsel. Id. at 306.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 307-11.
141. See id. at 312-14.
142. See id. at 311 (discussing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987)).
143. M.A. II, 899 F.2d at 317; see supra text accompanying notes 117-25.
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serted,' 44 the agency should have been accorded considerably less
deference than if the agency had made factual or credibility
determinations.'45
1. The Fourth Circuit's Abuse of Discretion Standard Diverges
from Federal Precedent
The Fourth Circuit diverged from the developed asylum juris-
prudence of the Ninth Circuit, the only circuit that had directly ad-
dressed the issue of what standard of review applies to a motion to
reopen a deportation hearing in cases where the Board bases its deci-
sion on the movant's failure to establish a prima facie case. The
Ninth Circuit, in Maldonado-Cruz v. INS,'46 decided a case very simi-
lar to M.A. II. In Maldonado-Cruz, the Board dismissed the asylum
application of a politically neutral Salvadoran. 147 The Board held
that, as a matter of law, the applicant's fear of persecution by either
Salvadoran guerillas or the military did not constitute persecution on
account of political opinion, within the meaning of the Immigration
and Nationality Act ("INA") as amended by the Refugee Act. 148 The
Board based this decision solely on a legal interpretation of the INA,
and did not question the petitioner's evidence or credibility.1 49 On
review, the Ninth Circuit concluded that, "[b]ecause resolution of this
matter involves a question of law, we review the decision of the
[Board] de novo." 50 The court held that the petitioner was entitled to
a withholding of deportation.15'
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit, in Ghadessi v. INS,'5 2 applied a de
novo standard of review to the question of prima facie eligibility for
144. M.A. I, 899 F.2d at 317 (Winter, J., dissenting) (citing Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at
447-48).
145. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 447-48 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)). In Chevron USA., Inc., the
court reasoned that:
[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must
reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional in-
tent.... If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains
that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the
law and must be given effect.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
146. 883 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1989).
147. Id. at 789.
148. Id. at 791. -
149. Id.
150. Id (emphasis added).
151. Maldonado-Cruz, 883 F.2d at 793.
152. 797 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1986).
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reopening deportation proceedings, the same question that the Fourth
Circuit faced in M.A. I. In Ghadessi, the court admitted that it gen-
erally employed an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing the
Board's denial of a petition to reopen deportation proceedings to ap-
ply for asylum. 53 But, the court further stated that, "when the
[Board] restricts its decision ... to whether the alien has established a
prima facie case, this is the only basis for the decision that we re-
view."' 154 This determination, the court concluded, represented a
question of law, and was not a matter for the Board's discretion. 155
Accordingly, the court considered only whether the Board's determi-
nation concerning the prima facie case was "correct."1 56 Against this
standard, the Ninth Circuit held that Ghadessi established a prima
facie case of a well-founded fear of persecution and was entitled to a
withholding of deportation.
5 7
Most significantly, and contrary to the Fourth Circuit's reason-
ing in M.A. II, the Ninth Circuit, in Shafiei v. INS, 58 applied the
Ghadessi standard, and consequently overturned the Board's ruling
on prima facie eligibility. Importantly, the Shafiei decision occurred
after the Abudu decision.' 59 Therefore, Abudu did not change the
Ninth Circuit's standard of review relating to the question of prima
facie eligibility. 160
Thus, although the Fourth Circuit could not look to its own rul-
ings for authority as to which standard to apply, it could have looked
to, or at least acknowledged, the decisions of other circuit courts, par-
ticularly the Ninth Circuit.' 6' Instead, the Fourth Circuit ignored
these decisions and created its own law, without persuasive explana-
153. Id. at 805 (citing Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 513 (9th Cir. 1985)).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 805 n.2, 806.
157. Ghadessi, 797 F.2d at 809.
158. 877 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1989) (unpublished).
159. See id.
160. See id.; M.A. II, 899 F.2d at 318 (Winter, J., dissenting).
161. The majority's contention that the Supreme Court's decision in Abudu constitutes
support for its determination regarding prima facie eligibility must fail. The Supreme Court
did not really address the issue of what standard of review applies to a denial based on a
movant's failure to establish a prima facie case of eligibility. Although the Supreme Court
certainly had the opportunity to approve the Ninth Circuit's reasoning as it applied to prima
facie liability in Abudu, it instead offered no "view of its validity," commenting only that the
"untimeliness of an asylum claim may be relevant to the [Board's] decision as to the prima
facie case on reopening." Abudu, 485 U.S. at 109, n. 14. However, the Fourth Circuit mooted
any consideration of M.A.'s untimeliness when it ruled that M.A. had reasonably explained his
failure to apply for asylum at his original hearing. M.A. II, 899 F.2d at 306.
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tion or support. The erroneous result notwithstanding, such total dis-
regard for the opinions of other circuits undermines the benefits of
conflicts among the circuits-that a multiplicity of judicial views con-
tributes to the thoughtful evolution of the law.' 62 By not addressing
the conflicting opinions in an honest, forthright manner, the Fourth
Circuit failed to allow such evolution to take place. Moreover, its
disregard for the Ninth Circuit decisions undermines the benefits of
conformity within the circuits. When the circuits are split on an is-
sue, there is the potential that different laws will be enacted in differ-
ent geographic regions of the United States. 163
The appropriate standard for reviewing a denial by the Board to
reopen, based on a failure to make a prima facie showing, remains
unsettled among the circuits. Outside of the developed asylum juris-
prudence of the Ninth Circuit and the sole Fourth Circuit decision of
M.A. II, no circuit has addressed the issue. 164 This Note maintains
that the Ninth Circuit properly decided the issue of the applicable
standard of review.
2. A De Novo Standard of Review Does Not Threaten Finality in
Asylum Proceedings
The Fourth Circuit's fear of unsettling finality is unconvincing.
There is little support for the notion that a de novo standard would
threaten the Board's interest in finality. The Fourth Circuit, relying
on Abudu, acknowledged that the Board may deny reopening to those
applicants who (1) fail to reasonably explain their inability to timely
assert political asylum; (2) neglect to present new evidence; or (3) do
not convince the Board that they will ultimately prevail on the mer-
its. 165 Clearly, the Board possesses a great degree of unfettered discre-
tion in making its determinations. 166  These provisions provide
sufficient safeguards and significant hurdles for a petitioner to over-
162. For a discussion of the benefits and burdens of judicial review in asylum cases, see
Stephen H. Legomsky, Political Asylum and the Theory of Judicial Review, 73 MINN. L. REV.
1205, 1214 (1989).
163. Id. at 1213.
164. In Etugh v. INS, 921 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1990), the First Circuit addressed the uncer-
tainty in this area of the law and cited Ghadessi as the controlling law for the Ninth Circuit.
Id. at 38. However, the First Circuit did not have to decide which standard to apply since,
under either a de novo or an abuse of discretion standard, the court would have affirmed the
Board's determination that Etugh failed to establish a prima facie case. Id. at 39.
165. M.A. II, 899 F.2d at 308.
166. See AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND BUSINESS
§ 10.5(e)(3), at 10-37 (1990) ("Questions of statutory construction rarely arise with regard to
motions to reopen a final order of deportation even if a prima facie case is presented. It may
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come. Applicants will rarely manage to satisfactorily explain a failure
to assert a fear of persecution at the initial proceeding. 67 Further,
even rarer are the applicants who can explain their dilatoriness, at
which point the Board forgoes its discretionary option of denying mo-
tions and rules on the prima facie case.168 Therefore, by the time ap-
plicants jump through all of the difficult procedural hoops, the
number of cases decided purely on the prima facie showing should be
quite small. 69 As a result, a de novo review of that determination
will only minimally affect the reopening process.1 70 This scant effect
is a small price to pay, given the importance of ensuring a fair oppor-
tunity to develop and present asylum cases.
3. The Political Question Argument Is Irrelevant
in Asylum Proceedings
That the court must defer to the Board because of the "inher-
ently political nature"' 7' of the deportation decision is an inappropri-
ate conclusion. It is ironic, as the dissenting opinion in M.A. HI
pointed out, that the court should fear infringement on a political de-
cision that is not supposed to be political at all.172
The Fourth Circuit's erroneous judgment in framing M.A.'s de-
portation decision as a political question can best be understood in an
historical context. Before Congress passed the Refugee Act, the
United States' definition of refugee was largely based on a national
perception of a world framed by the Cold War. Until the passage of
the Refugee Act, refugees were defined more by their countries of ori-
gin than by the circumstances that caused them to leave. 73 Specifi-
cally, prior immigration law favored refugees fleeing from persecution
in communist or "communist-dominated" countries, or from the gen-
properly decide that the relief sought would not be granted even assuming statutory eligibility





171. M.A. II, 899 F.2d at 309.
172. Id at 319 (Winter, J., dissenting); H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 13
(1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141 (under the Refugee Act, "the plight of the refugees
themselves, as opposed to national origin or political considerations, should be paramount in
determining which refugees are to be admitted to the United States" (emphasis added)).
173. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 201, 66 Stat.
163, 175 (1952), amended by Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). See generally ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra
note 4, at 638-43.
[Vol. 14:139
Asylum for the Conscientious Objector
eral area of the Middle East. 74 Although the Protocol 75 required
that the United States, as a signatory, not deport refugees to any
country where they would face persecution, the United States contin-
ued to utilize a refugee provision that made distinctions based on the
country of origin. 176 Congress' primary purpose in enacting the Refu-
gee Act was to remove ideological bias in asylum determinations. 77
The legislative history of the Refugee Act emphasizes that "the plight
of the refugees themselves, as opposed to national origin or political
considerations, should be paramount in determining which refugees
are to be admitted to the United States."17 8 Moreover, Congress in-
tended the Refugee Act to give "statutory meaning to our national
commitment to human rights and humanitarian concerns."' 179 Under
the Refugee Act, the United States must grant refugee status to any-
one who meets the requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). s° In
Cardoza-Fonseca, the Supreme Court affirmed the neutrality of the
Refugee Act, indicating that its promulgation made refugee status de-
terminations based upon geographic and political distinctions abso-
lutely unacceptable. '81
Notwithstanding congressional intent that the INS and Board
apply the Refugee Act neutrally, both the statistics and critics of the
United States asylum program indicate that the Refugee Act has not
been so applied. 182 According to figures covering fiscal year 1990, the
approval rate for asylum cases filed with INS district directors was as
follows: China, 91.1%; Soviet Union, 82.4%; Romania, 54.9%; Af-
ghanistan, 38.8%; Nicaragua, 16.2%; and El Salvador, 2.5%. The
overall approval rate for the period was 14.7%.183
174. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7). See generally ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 4, at
638-43.
175. See supra note 54.
176. See generally ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 4.
177. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 435.
178. H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., at 13 (1979), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 141.
179. S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
141.
180. See Anker & Posner, supra note 52, at 34-56 (discussing Congress' concerns with and
desire to control executive branch dominance of asylum and refugee policy).
181. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 421.
182. See THE IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, IMMIGRA-
TION LAW AND DEFENSE § 13.1, at 13-9 (3d ed. 1991); see also Asylum Cases Filed with INS
District Directors Approved and Denied, by Selected Nationalities, REFUGEE REP., Dec. 21,
1990, at 12 [hereinafter Asylum Cases].
183. See Asylum Cases; supra note 182, at 12. The statistics were even more dramatic
when M.A. I was argued. According to figures covering the first three quarters of 1987, the
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A viable argument can certainly be made that the great disparity
in these figures is attributable, in part, to the fact that more applicants
come from Central America, and particularly from El Salvador. 184 It
is likely that, by virtue of the larger number of applicants, there is also
a larger percentage of meritless claims. However, it would be intellec-
tually dishonest to attribute the disparity entirely to these factors, and
to ignore the suggestion that the INS has allowed an impermissible
taint of ideology into the asylum process.8 5 Rather, the statistical
disparities illustrate that political considerations and foreign policy
goals have invaded the asylum process.18 6 By resurrecting the notion
that deportation decisions are "inherently political,"' 187 the Fourth
Circuit dragged the United States a decade backward, and, more im-
portantly, denied M.A. the protection of the law to which he was
entitled. Further, by recognizing conscientious objectors as eligible
approval rate for asylum cases filed with INS district directors was as follows: Nicaragua,
83.9%; Iran, 67.4%; Romania, 59.7%; Afghanistan, 26.2%; Guatemala, 3.8%; and El Salva-
dor, 3.6%. M.A. II, 899 F.2d at 320 (Winter, J., dissenting) (citing THE IMMIGRATION PRO-
JECT OF THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND DEFENSE § 13.1(c), at
13-8 n.9 (3d ed. 1989). The overall approval rate for the period was 54%. Id. Further, among
those aliens basing an asylum application on fear of torture, the INS only deported aliens from
El Salvador. Id. (citing THE IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD,
IMMIGRATION LAW AND DEFENSE § 13.1(c), at 13-8 n.9 (3d ed. 1989) (citing U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASYLUM: UNIFORM APPLICATIONS OF STANDARDS UNCERTAIN 15-
17, 34 (1987) (briefing report to Senator Arlen Specter))).
184. In fact, during fiscal year 1990, Salvadorans filed 8648 cases with INS district direc-
tors, the most filed by any country. See Asylum Cases, supra note 182, at 12.
185. See Debbie Smith, Unprecedented Victory for Guatemalan and Salvadoran Asylum
Applicants: American Baptist Churches Settlement Agreement, IMMIGR. J., April-June 1991, at
27.
186. The passage of the Immigration Act of 1990, supra note 51, arguably undermines the
argument that political considerations should not invade the asylum process, because, in fact,
they have. Section 302 of the Act establishes procedures for establishing "temporary protected
status" for nationals of certain countries who have suffered as a consequence of internal armed
conflict, natural disaster, or other extraordinary circumstances of temporary duration. Immi-
gration Act of 1990 § 304 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1254a). The aliens will be authorized to
accept employment, but will not have lawful permanent residence or other long-term status
under the immigration laws. Id Section 303 specifically designates El Salvador as a country
whose nationals will receive temporary protected status. Id. § 303. Thus, while the author
argues that refugee decisions should be made without reference to the alien's country of origin,
applicants similar to the petitioner in M.A. II will be treated preferentially under the Immigra-
tion Act of 1990. Nevertheless, the Act does not help asylum applicants from all countries,
and, in any case, it is only a temporary remedy.
Ironically, preferential treatment for Salvadoran aliens comes at a time when El Salva-
dor's civil war, which has plagued the country for 11 years, decimating the countryside and
killing 75,000 Salvadorans, may finally be coming to an end. John J. Goldman & Kenneth
Freed, Cristiani, Rebels in Salvador Pact, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1991, at Al.
187. M.A. II, 899 F.2d at 309.
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for political asylum, the courts, rather than infringing on congres-
sional decision-making powers, would be effectuating congressional
intent.
B. The Case Against the Fourth Circuit's Test for Establishing the
Prima Facie Case of Well-Founded Fear
In order for an alien to reopen a deportation hearing to include a
request for political asylum, the individual must present a prima facie
case of eligibility for relief. 188 An alien establishes a prima facie case
for refugee status when the alien presents "affidavits or other docu-
mentary evidence" that, if true, demonstrate a well-founded fear of
persecution, based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a par-
ticular social group, or political opinion. 189 It cannot be disputed that
M.A. H presented a special problem for the Fourth Circuit's analysis
of a prima facie case, because the Protocol, Convention, and Refugee
Act do not explicitly address conscientious objectors. 19°
The Handbook, however, contains eight paragraphs describing
situations in which it would be appropriate for aliens who have fled
their countries to avoid compulsory service to be granted refugee sta-
tus, and thus be eligible for asylum. 191 In fact, the Handbook identi-
fies deserters and individuals avoiding military service as a special
category of refugee.19 2 Although the Handbook acknowledges that
draft evasion should not generally provide a basis upon which individ-
uals may qualify for refugee status, it also notes that there are times
when such status should be granted.1 93 Moreover, the Handbook pro-
vides that the "necessity to perform military service may be the sole
ground for a claim to refugee status." 194 Specifically, the Handbook
explains that such status should be granted when an applicant can
show that compulsory military service would require the applicant's
participation in military action "contrary to his genuine political, reli-
gious or moral convictions, or to valid reasons of conscience."'195 For
individuals, like M.A., who object based on political convictions, the
Handbook adds one additional requirement: the applicant must
188. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 (1991); Hernandez-Ortiz, 777 F.2d at 513.
189. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5; Hernandez-Ortiz, 777 F.2d at 513.
190. See supra Section III.
191. HANDBOOK, supra note 2, paras. 167-74.
192. Id.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 71-79, which describes when such refugee status
should nevertheless be granted.
194. HANDBOOK, supra note 2, para. 170 (emphasis added).
195. Id. (emphasis added).
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demonstrate that the "type of military action, with which [the objec-
tor] does not wish to be associated is condemned by the international
community as contrary to basic rules of human conduct."'
196
Despite the majority's professed adherence to the Handbook in
M.A. II, the text of the relevant Handbook paragraphs does not con-
tain the three additional requirements engrafted by the majority.
Thus, the majority created a new test, requiring applicants in M.A.'s
position to demonstrate (1) a formal official policy of the government
in question that promotes human rights violations; (2) condemnation
of the military actions by international governmental bodies; and (3)
that the individual will be compelled to engage personally in inhuman
conduct as part of his military service. 97 These additional require-
ments do not appear in the Handbook, nor does the majority point to
any authority suggesting that the United Nations intended to include
them in the Handbook. In fact, logic dictates that the majority's addi-
tional requirements have no foundation, since their inclusion would
substantially vitiate any recognition of conscientious objection as a
viable basis for political asylum-a conclusion the United Nations
could not possibly have intended.
1. A Requirement That Governments Adhere to a Formal Policy
of Human Rights Violation Has No Basis in the
Refugee Act or the Handbook
To qualify for refugee status based on political convictions, the
majority in M.A. II first required that the government in question ad-
here to a formal policy of violating human rights and international
law. 198 Such a requirement has no foundation in the Refugee Act or
the Handbook. In fact, the Handbook speaks only of the "type of
military action,"' 199 and does not mention governmental policy with
respect to such action. As the dissenting opinion in M.A. II pointed
out, "the requirement that the Salvadoran government issue an official
policy of torture or indiscriminate killing can never be satisfied; no
government wishing to remain even remotely connected with the in-
ternational community would openly advocate such a policy."
2
Similarly, in Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS,20' the Ninth Circuit noted
196. Id. para. 171 (emphasis added).
197. M.A. II, 899 F.2d at 312-15.
198. Id. at 312-13.
199. HANDBOOK, supra note 2, para. 171.
200. M.A. II, 899 F.2d at 322 (Winter, J., dissenting).
201. 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984).
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that "persecutors are hardly likely to provide their victims with affida-
vits attesting to their acts of persecution. ' 20 2 Rather, it should be suf-
ficient that M.A. and others similarly situated show that their home
governments are unwilling or unable to control the offending
groups.
20 3
The "unwilling or unable" standard is entirely workable as an
exclusive standard for courts to adjudicate asylum claims. In fact,
there are several factors by which courts could measure whether a
home government is "unable or unwilling" to control an offending
group. Namely, courts could consider the prevalence or pervasive-
ness of offending conduct. Clearly, sporadic instances of atrocities
should not be conclusive evidence of a government's inability to con-
trol an offending group. Every war, by definition, will spawn barbari-
ties of varying degrees. However, where charges of offensive conduct
are voluminous and widespread, it is not a far leap of faith to surmise
that a home government, for whatever reason, is unable or unwilling
to control an offending group.
Furthermore, courts could consider a home government's record
of capturing, trying, and convicting the members of an offending
group as evidence of that country's commitment to curbing human
rights violations. If, for example, there is no correlation between
claims of atrocities and the prosecution of their perpetrators, courts
could reasonably question the sincerity of that country's efforts to
curtail these violations. Similarly, if there is no correlation between
the number of prosecutions and the number of successful prosecu-
tions, courts could question that country's sincerity.
Nevertheless, the majority in M.A. II feared that "any male alien
of draft age from just about any country experiencing civil strife could
establish a well-founded fear of persecution, unless the court required
the asylum applicant to prove that the violence is connected with offi-
cial government policy."'2°4 In reaching this conclusion, however, the
majority failed to acknowledge that there are other hurdles to over-
come before an applicant can obtain refugee status. First, the appli-
cant must show that the government in question is unwilling or
unable to control the offending group, which, in M.A.'s case, was the
202. Id. at 1285.
203. See Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1434 (9th Cir. 1987) (persecution by a single
member of the armed forces that the Duarte government could not control provided a basis for
a well-founded fear); Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1284 (applicant for asylum must show
"[p]ersecution by the government or by a group which the government is unable to control").
204. M.A. II, 899 F.2d at 312 (emphasis in original).
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armed forces. 205 Second, the applicant must show that the interna-
tional community has condemned this military action. 206 Third, the
applicant must show specific objective evidence that he or members of
his group have been, or will be, subjected to persecution.20 7 Thus, the
majority opinion disregarded the hurdles already set in place, and ad-
ded another, more stringent evidentiary burden.
2. A Requirement That Condemnation Come from an
International Governmental Body Is Unfounded
The Handbook provides that refugee status may be granted when
the military action with which the individual does not wish to be asso-
ciated is "condemned by the international community as contrary to
basic rules of human conduct. ' 208 While it is true that the term "in-
ternational community" may certainly include the United Nations2°9
or "recognized international governmental bodies, '210 the Handbook
does not imply that these bodies represent the sole sources of interna-
tional opinion and that asylum applicants must wait for such declara-
tions, exclusively, to avoid deportation. As the dissent in M.A. II
pointed out, if the Board or a court ignores the evidence supplied by
private agencies, "producing evidence of international condemnation
would often be virtually impossible. ' 211  Additionally, as the First
Circuit correctly noted in Ananeh-Firempong v. INS,212 "unless an
alien were allowed to rely upon [outside, non-governmental] sources,
it is difficult to see how he or she could make out a case of political or
social repression in a distant land. '21 3 There will be few instances
where the executive body of any government will publicly make state-
ments about its allies' humanitarian violations, since a "finding that
persecution is likely reflects official skepticism about the willingness
or ability of a foreign government to guarantee a modicum of civilized
205. McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 1981).
206. HANDBOOK, supra note 2, para. 171.
207. See Figeroa v. INS, 886 F.2d 76, 80 (4th Cir. 1989); see also Cruz-Lopez v. INS, 802
F.2d 1518, 1522 (4th Cir. 1986).
208. HANDBOOK, supra note 2, para. 171.
209. The United Nations has, in fact, "expressed deep concern at the situation of human
rights in El Salvador." M.A. II, 899 F.2d at 322 n.8 (Winter, J., dissenting) (quoting United
Nations General Assembly Resolution No. 401139 (Dec. 13, 1985)). In 1985, the United Na-
tions stated that "a situation of generalized warlike violence continues to exist... and that the
number of political prisoners and abductions has increased." Id.
210. M.A. I1, 899 F.2d at 312.
211. Id. at 323 (Winter, J., dissenting).
212. "766 F.2d 621 (1st Cir. 1985).
213. Id. at 628.
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behavior. ' 214 Accordingly, accepting the Board's and the majority's
contention that only condemnation by governmental bodies should be
persuasive renders meaningless Handbook paragraph 171.
A more reasonable interpretation of paragraph 171 would allow
an applicant to show that the military action that the applicant seeks
to avoid violates the fundamental rules of humanitarian law. The
United Nations has laid out these fundamental rules very clearly.
215
The minimum standards articulated by the United Nations include:
(1) the affirmative obligation to treat persons not active in the military
actions humanely; and (2) the absolute prohibition of murdering, mu-
tilating, torturing, or treating cruelly said persons, or passing
sentences and carrying out executions without previous judgment pro-
nounced by a regularly constituted court.216 Alternatively, the Re-
statement (Third) of Foreign Relations provides:
A state violates international law if... it practices, encourages, or
condones
(a) genocide,
(b) slavery or slave trade,
(c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals,
(d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment,
(e) prolonged arbitrary detention,
(f) systematic racial discrimination, or
(g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights.
2 17
Additionally, both Amnesty International and Americas Watch
have been on the forefront of developing human rights laws, and their
reports have long been considered authoritative sources of interna-
tional law. Thus, in Coriolan v. INS,218 the Fifth Circuit reasoned
that, although the opinion of Amnesty International is not preceden-
tial law in the Fifth Circuit or to the INS, it is "certainly relevant"
and its "materiality ... is surely beyond dispute. ' 219
214. Legomsky, supra note 162, at 1209.
215. M.A. , 858 F.2d 210, 219 (4th Cir. 1988) (quoting Geneva Convention, Aug. 12,
1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3).
216. Id.
217. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 702 (1986).
218. 559 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977).
219. Id. at 1002-03.
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3. Permitting the Introduction of Non-Governmental Reports Is
Not Tantamount to the United States' Disapproval of
Another Country's Policy
The majority's argument that the inherently political nature of
the dispute220 forbids it from considering nongovernmental reports is
entirely vacuous. By permitting asylum applicants to proffer evidence
of condemnation from private organizations, a court does not indicate
its approval of such opinions, but merely recognizes that a "reason-
able person" could fear persecution should the conditions reported
actually exist. Even if a court decides that an alien has a well-founded
fear, such a determination only suggests that one individual fears per-
secution.221 Such a finding is not tantamount to a United States dec-
laration that the government in question is an international outlaw.
222
Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that the average foreign sov-
ereign is at least knowledgeable of the basic underpinnings of our tri-
partite system of government. With this knowledge, the foreign
government would understand that the pronouncements of our rela-
tively independent judiciary do not necessarily represent the policy of
the United States government, in general, or of its legislative or execu-
tive branches, in particular. Even if foreign states perceive a court's
judgment as an approval of the opinions of private organizations,
Congress has explicitly empowered the federal judiciary to do just
that-to review and, if necessary, correct INS determinations of the
asylum standard.
223
Perhaps the most compelling response to the majority's nonjusti-
ciability argument is that the courts and the United States are com-
mitting hypocrisy by refusing to consider all relevant evidence, in fear
that they may be indirectly criticizing a government currently friendly
to the United States. As Judge Breyer of the First Circuit so poign-
antly said, "To offer refuge to those faced with genuine threats of per-
secution but to forbid them to offer journalistic accounts, expert
opinions, and third-party reports in their efforts to prove it would
simply 'sound the word of promise to the ear but break it to the
hope.' "224
220. See supra text accompanying notes 105-06.
221. M.A. HI, 899 F.2d at 323 n.II (Winter, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 323.
223. See 8 U.S.C. § 1 105a(a) (final orders of deportation, and the basis for these orders, are
reviewable by United States courts of appeals).
224. Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621, 628 (1st Cir. 1985).
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C. The Majority's Contention That the Salvadoran Government Did
Not Threaten M.A. Specifically Is Unfounded
The majority in M.A. H noted that, to satisfy the well-founded
fear test, a court must find that an applicant has a genuine subjective
fear of persecution, and that an objective basis, sufficient to render
that fear reasonable, exists.225 Unquestionably, M.A. fled El Salvador
because of fear generated by his personal experiences with the mili-
tary.226 Thus, M.A. satisfied the subjective component of the well-
founded fear test. As to the objective component, an asylum appli-
cant must provide "specific and objective facts," detailing a "good
reason" to fear or "reasonably expect" persecution. 227 M.A. provided
detailed descriptions of the Salvadoran repression against both his
family and himself,228 as well as compelling affidavits in support of his
petition.2
29
Nevertheless, the majority found M.A.'s evidence insufficient to
prove that the military threatened him personally or that it would
force him to commit the condemned acts if he returned to his coun-
try.230 The burden the majority placed on M.A. and other applicants
similarly situated is overwhelming. Evidence of persecution can be
unusually inaccessible. 231 The most knowledgeable witnesses and the
225. M.A. II, 899 F.2d at 311.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 30-36.
227. Figeroa, 886 F.2d at 80.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
229. Dr. Charles Clements, who practiced medicine in El Salvador for one year and inter-
viewed at least 60 government soldiers released after capture by the guerillas, stated:
I was told by prisoners that they are taught to kill women and children because
women are potential factories for more guerillas, and children are seeds of the gueril-
las. I was told that it was common practice to torture known guerillas and that it
was not unusual that women who were considered sympathizers with guerillas would
be raped. I have seen prisoners as young as 15 years old who were in the regular
army. When asked why they participated in search and destroy operations in which
many innocent civilians are killed, they explained that to show any sign of hesitation
or reluctance is to invite personal danger from superiors. When asked why they do
not desert, they repeatedly told me that they have seen pictures of deserters posted in
their barracks along side pictures of their families bearing such inscriptions as "killed
in the cross fire."
M.A. 1, 858 F.2d at 217.
William M. Leo Grande, Director of Political Science at the School of Government and
Public Administration at American University in Washington, D.C., said:
To be a man of military age and not to have served in the Armed Forces, in addition
to fled [sic] the country, is enough to create the suspicion the individual is an oppo-
nent of the government. And to be suspected of being an opponent of the govern-
ment in El Salvador, is to be in grave danger.
Id.
230. M.A. 11, 899 F.2d at 314.
231. Legomsky, supra note 162, at 1208.
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most probative documentary evidence for deportation hearings might
be overseas.232 In the rush of fleeing, refugees often lack the time and
foresight to gather crucial documentation. 233 Furthermore, even if
the applicant has access to witnesses, those witnesses may be unwill-
ing to testify on the applicant's behalf, for fear of retaliation.
The burden the majority placed on applicants also contravenes
basic judicial precedent. In Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS,234 the Ninth Cir-
cuit recognized that
refugees sometimes are in no position to gather documentary evi-
dence establishing specific or individual persecution or a threat of
such persecution. Accordingly, if documentary evidence is not
available, the applicant's testimony will suffice if it is credible, per-
suasive, and refers to "specific facts that give rise to an inference
that the applicant has been or has a good reason to fear that he or
she will be singled out for persecution .... ,,235
VI. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit incorrectly decided M.A. A26851062 v. INS,
and created an improper legal standard to apply to draft resisters
seeking refugee status. The Fourth Circuit gave undue deference to
the Board in cases involving motions to reopen deportation proceed-
ings. Further, and perhaps most importantly, the Fourth Circuit mis-
interpreted and incorrectly applied the Handbook to M.A. The
Handbook clearly recommends refugee status for conscientious objec-
tors, like M.A. At the very least, the Fourth Circuit's decision in
M.A. II indicates the ambiguous status of aliens who fear persecution
due to their objections to obligatory military service. Eleven years
ago, Congress enacted the Refugee Act to bring the United States into
compliance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol and Conven-
tion.236 The Handbook "provides significant guidance in construing
the Protocol. ' 237 This same Handbook explicitly includes the consci-
entious objector as a worthy recipient of refugee status. Thus, under
the Refugee Act, conscientious objectors, like M.A., should be enti-
tled to refugee status. The Fourth Circuit's refusal to recognize the
relationship between the Refugee Act, the Protocol, and the Hand-
232. Id
233. Id.
234. 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985), affid, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
235. Id. at 1453 (quoting Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 574 (7th Cir. 1984)).
236. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
237. Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 480 U.S. 421, 439 n.22 (1987).
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book, while claiming strict adherence to the Handbook, is contradic-
tory and devastating to M.A. and others in M.A.'s position.
The M.A. H decision should alert Congress to the need for a clar-
ification of its refugee policy. Just as Congress formerly attempted to
conform the United States' immigration policy to its international ob-
ligations, the present Congress should do the same, but more explic-
itly. If courts do not recognize that the definition of "refugee"
encompasses the conscientious objector, Congress should add "valid
reasons of conscience" to the current list of grounds for refugee sta-
tus. This addition would protect aliens who have "valid reasons of
conscience" for not serving in compulsory military service and who
have well-founded fears of persecution on this account. Such an addi-
tion would not only preserve the original thrust of the Refugee Act,
but, more importantly, it would preserve the lives of many
individuals.
Although M.A. was deported to El Salvador, his particular
whereabouts are presently unknown. 238 And, while it may be that
M.A. has returned to a less terrifying and threatening El Salvador
than he had feared, it may also be worse than he had imagined.
Whatever the reality M.A. faced upon his return, one cannot ignore
the bottom line-that the United States sent back a man who may be
or may already have been persecuted, imprisoned, or even killed for
adhering to his religious, political, or moral convictions. The M.A. II
decision undermines the humanitarian ideals expressed by the Refu-
gee Act, the values of individual conscience, the protection of reli-
gious freedom, and the broader ideal of recognizing conscientious
objection as a fundamental human right. The United States should
not tolerate such a result.
Corii D. Berg*
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